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PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE AFTER
CONFIRMATION OF A CHAPTER 13
REPAYMENT PLAN: BALANCING
COMPETING INTERESTS
Abstract: Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is unclear whether property of
the estate and protection of the automatic stay continue after confirmation of debtor's
repayment plan. Courts use diverse approaches to determine whether property of the
estate exists after confirmation, resulting in confusion for trustees, debtors, and creditors.
This Comment proposes that bankruptcy courts use their equitable powers and adopt a
test that balances the competing interests of debtor and creditor.

Under bankruptcy law, an automatic stay protects debtor's property
of the estate from creditors. In Chapter 13' proceedings, property of
the estate includes property debtor owns at the time of fMling the bankruptcy petition, as well as property debtor acquires after filing. The
stay remains in effect during the period from filing the bankruptcy
petition until confirmation of the repayment plan, but courts disagree
whether the stay continues after confirmation.
To answer this question, courts must decide whether property of the
estate exists after confirmation. The relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code (the Code),2 however, create an ambiguity as to when
property of the estate ceases to exist-at confirmation, or when the
case is closed, dismissed, or converted. Thus, courts, as well as trustees, debtors, and creditors, cannot agree whether the automatic stay
continues after confirmation. If the stay continues after confirmation,
post-confirmation creditors must first seek relief from stay before proceeding against debtor's property of the estate.
Courts should use a balancing test to decide whether property of the
estate exists after confirmation and therefore receives protection from
the automatic stay. Courts should evaluate whether allowing the postconfirmation creditor's action adversely effects debtor's ability to complete plan payments, whether performing the plan requires the property at issue, whether continuing the stay irreparably harms the postconfirmation creditor, and whether debtor carries his weight in the
rehabilitation process by not abusing the stay's protection. To resolve
the issue and further the goals of bankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts
should consider the foregoing factors while weighing the rights of the
individual debtor and creditor.
1. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (codified as
amended at I 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989)).
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PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE IN CHAPTER 13
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

Chapter 13's dual goals are to rehabilitate debtor and to equitably
distribute debtor's assets to creditors.' An automatic stay, imposed
when debtor files the bankruptcy petition, facilitates these goals. The
stay protects debtor's property owned at the time the bankruptcy petition is filed from all pre-petition and some post-petition creditors'
actions. However, the stay protects property acquired after filing only
if it qualifies as property of the estate. Although Chapter 13 property
of the estate includes property debtor acquires after filing the bankruptcy petition, courts disagree whether property of the estate exists
after confirmation. To determine whether the stay remains in effect
after confirmation, courts must decide whether property of the estate
exists after confirmation.
A.

Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: Purpose and Scope

Bankruptcy proceedings under Chapter 13 are voluntary and generally available to individuals earning regular incomes.4 Congress
intended Chapter 13 as the preferred method of bankruptcy for consumer debtors. 5 Chapter 13 generally allows debtors to retain their
property while repaying creditors.6
In 1978, Congress revised the Bankruptcy Act of 1938 to reflect the
7
increase in consumer bankruptcies since the end of World War II.
3. See Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1,
61 (1978).
4. Only individuals owing, on the date the petition is filed, less than $100,000 of
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts, and less than $350,000 of noncontingent, liquidated,
secured debts may file under Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West 1979). A claim is
contingent if debtor's legal duty to pay does not come into existence until triggered by a future
event. NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 68.05, at 13 (1987). Regular income is
income sufficiently regular and stable to enable debtor to make plan payments. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 101(29) (West Supp. 1989).
5. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6078 [hereinafter 1978 HOUSE REPORT].

6. Id. at 6079. In contrast, in Chapter 7 proceedings, debtor must surrender to the trustee all
non-exempt assets for liquidation and sale. Id.
Additional reasons why Congress prefers Chapter 13 to straight bankruptcy (Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings) include protecting debtor's credit standing, avoiding stigma attached to
straight bankruptcy, and retaining pride by meeting one's obligations. Creditors also benefit
because the losses are significantly less than if debtor files for straight bankruptcy. Id.
7. In 1970, Congress appointed The Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to
evaluate changes in social and economic conditions occurring since the last major revisions of the
Bankruptcy Act in 1938. H.R. REP. No. 927, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1970 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3559, 3560 [hereinafter 1970 HOUSE REPORT]. For the complete
text of the Bankruptcy Commission's findings, see REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
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The revisions simplified bankruptcy laws and accommodated the
increase in consumer bankruptcies by simplifying, expanding, and
making more flexible Chapter 13 wage earner plans.' Under the new
Code, individuals earning regular incomes may propose and carry out
reasonable plans for debt repayment under Chapter 13.1 After filing
the petition for relief, debtor proposes and files with the bankruptcy
court a plan for repaying creditors.10
The court confirms debtor's plan if the plan complies with Chapter
13 requirements. 1 The court will not confirm the plan if either the
trustee or holders of allowed unsecured claims object.' 2 Confirmation
binds debtor and all creditors to the confirmed plan's provisions,
whether or not the plan provides for particular creditors. 13 In addition, except as otherwise provided in the plan, all property of the
estate vests in debtor free of the claims or interests of creditors designated in the plan. 14

BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pts.
I-II (1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORTS I, II, AND III]. The Commission reported a
tremendous increase in consumer credit after the end of World War II resulting in a conflict
between the interests of debtors and creditors. To ease the conflict, the Commission sought to
increase the cooperation between the two parties to achieve debtor rehabilitation. In response to
the Commission's report, Congress acknowledged the hardship on consumers overburdened with
debt and criticized the credit industry's abusive extension of credit. Consumers and creditors
should both bear the responsibility for debtor's predicament. See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra
note 5, at 6076-77; COMMISSION REPORT III, supra, at 49, 51, 59, 86.
8. See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6078.
9. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS, 5787, 5799 [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT]. Eligible individuals include traditional
wage earners, self-employed persons with regular incomes, and individuals living on welfare,
social security, fixed pension incomes or investment incomes. Id. at 5810.
10. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321, 1322 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). The bankruptcy case commences
upon filing the petition for relief with the court. Id. § 301 (West 1979). Chapter 13 debtors file
repayment plans with the court listing creditors and the amount each creditor receives in
deferred cash payments. Id. §§ 1321, 1322(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). The term "wage
earner plans" developed because Chapter XIII under the 1938 Act was designed for individuals
earning regular wages. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The repayment plan requires
submission of all or part of debtor's future earnings and income to the supervision and control of
the trustee. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(1) (West 1979).
11. See id. § 1325(a) (setting forth the requirements for confirmation).
12. Id. § 1325(b) (West Supp. 1989). See id § 506 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (regarding
determination of secured status of creditors' claims).
13. Id. § 1327(a) (West 1979).
14. Id. § 1327(b)-(c).
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B. Property of the Estate in Chapter 13
When debtor files the bankruptcy petition, a bankruptcy case commences, creating an estate comprising debtor's property. 5 The estate
includes, with certain exceptions, all debtor's legal or equitable interests in property at the time the case is commenced. t6 The existing
interests and proceeds from such property represent the entire prop-7
erty of the estate for purposes of Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings.'
The provision defining Chapter 13 property of the estate, however,
expands the estate to include property debtor acquires after com-8
mencement of the case, including earnings from services performed.'
Characterization of property as property of the estate is important
in Chapter 13 proceedings for two reasons. First, debtor's future earnings or income constitute property of the estate and primarily fund the
repayment plan. 19 Second, an automatic stay protects property of the
estate from actions brought by all pre-petition and some post-petition
creditors.2 °
C. The Automatic Stay
The automatic stay facilitates debtor rehabilitation and equitable
distribution of debtor's estate to creditors.2 ' Filing of the bankruptcy
petition operates as an automatic stay prohibiting actions against both
15. Id. § 541(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (setting forth what is property of the estate in
bankruptcy proceedings).
16. Id. For a discussion regarding commencement of the bankruptcy case, see supra note 10.
17. See I1 U.S.C.A. §§ 704(1), 726 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); see also id. § 541(a)(5)
(property of the estate also includes property debtor acquires within 180 days after filing the
petition if acquired (1) by inheritance or gift, (2) as part of a property settlement, or (3) as a
beneficiary of life insurance).
18. The Code defines Chapter 13 property of the estate as follows:
(a) Property of the estate includes, in addition to the property specified in section 541 of
this title (1) all property of the kind specified in such section that the debtor acquires after the
commencement of the case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a
case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first; and
(2) earnings from services performed by the debtor after the commencement of the
case but before the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11,
or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first.
11 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1989).
19. Id. § 1322(a)(1) (West 1979). The sale of property of the estate may also fund the plan.
Id. § 1322(b)(8) (West Supp. 1989).
20. The stay of proceedings against property of the estate continues until such property no
longer is property of the estate. Id. § 362(c)(1) (West 1979).
21. The stay protects creditors by providing an orderly distribution of debtor's assets. 1978
SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 5835. The stay also gives debtor a breathing spell from
creditors permitting him to complete the repayment plan, and relieving him of the financial
pressures that led to bankruptcy. Id. at 5840-41; see also Kennedy, supra note 3, at 3.

680

Chapter 13 Property of the Estate
debtor and property of the estate.2 2 First, the stay prohibits judicial,
administrative, or other proceedings against debtor or property of the
estate to satisfy claims arising before filing the petition.2 3 Second, the
stay prohibits actions to obtain or create liens against property of the
estate to satisfy claims arising both before and after filing the petition.2 4 Therefore, pre-petition and post-petition creditors must obtain
court approval before proceeding against property of the estate.2 5
The duration of the stay in Chapter 13 cases is unclear. To determine whether the stay continues after confirmation, courts must
decide if property of the estate exists after confirmation. The stay initially protects property debtor owns at the time of filing the bankruptcy petition.2 6 In addition, courts unanimously agree that property
debtor acquires after commencement and before confirmation is property of the estate and protected by the stay.2 7 The Code is unclear,
22. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). But see id. § 362(b)(2) (West 1979)
(collection of alimony and child support may still proceed against property that is not property
of the estate).
23. See id. § 362(a)(1), (2), (5), (6) and (7) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
24. In Chapter 13, property of the estate includes property debtor acquires before and after
commencement of the case. Id. § 1306 (West Supp. 1989). Therefore, the stay protects against
post-petition claims to obtain property of the estate:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under section 301,
302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities
Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all
entities, of(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate ....
Id. § 362(a)(3)-(4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
25. Id § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989). After notice and hearing, the court may grant relief
from the stay. Id. § 362(d) (West Supp. 1989).
Actions taken in violation of the stay are at the very least void. See Johnson & O'Leary,
Automatic Stay Provisions of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 13 N.M.L. REv. 599, 618 (1983).
Debtors injured by creditors willfully violating the stay can recover their actual damages,
including costs and attorneys' fees. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(h) (West Supp. 1989); see, eg., In re
Batla, 12 Bankr. 397, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981) (debtor awarded damages, plus attorneys' fees
and costs, for loss of employment caused by creditor's garnishment proceedings). If appropriate,
punitive damages may be awarded. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(h) (West Supp. 1989). Creditors violating
the stay can be held in contempt by the bankruptcy court. E-g., In re Littke, 105 Bankr. 905, 908
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989). However, courts do not hold creditors in contempt who unknowingly
violate the stay. See Johnson & O'Leary, supra, at 618.
26. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a)(1) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989); see also id. § 362(a)(3)-(4) (West
1979 & Supp. 1989). While sections 362(a)(1), (2), (5), (6), and (7) protect property of the estate
from various types of actions arising before filing the bankruptcy petition, sections 362(a)(3) and
(4) protect property of the estate from actions arising after filing, including actions against
property of the estate after confirmation of debtor's repayment plan. Id. § 362(a)(1)-(7).
27. Eg., In re Mack, 46 Bankr. 652, 655 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (wages earned prior to filing
Chapter 13 petition and during pendency of case are property of the estate).
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however, whether property of the estate exists after confirmation. As
a result, courts disagree whether the stay's protection continues after
confirmation.
II.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO POST-CONFIRMATION
PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE

Determining what constitutes property of the estate after confirmation has not been an easy task for bankruptcy courts. Courts must
consider one of two questions when deciding what constitutes property of the estate after confirmation: (1) whether debtor's property
interests at commencement of the case remain property of the estate
after confirmation, and (2) whether debtor's property acquired after
confirmation ever qualifies as property of the estate. 2' The stay continues until property is no longer property of the estate. 29 Resolving
the status of property after confirmation is critical, therefore, because
the automatic stay protects only post-confirmation property qualifying
as property of the estate.3 0
Bankruptcy courts disagree whether post-confirmation property
constitutes property of the estate.3 ' Courts focus on an apparent
ambiguity between sections 1306 and 1327(b) of the Code.32 Section
1306 provides that, in addition to property owned at commencement
of the case, property of the estate includes property acquired after
commencement until the case is closed, dismissed, or converted.3 3
Section 1327(b) states that upon confirmation of debtor's plan, property of the estate vests in debtor.34 Section 1327(b), however, does not
indicate whether vesting in debtor means that property of the estate
ceases to exist. 3 ' Adding to the confusion, Code sections defining
28. For purposes of this Comment, the term "post-confirmation property" refers to property
acquired both before and after confirmation.
29. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(c)(1) (West 1979).
30. See id. § 362(a)(3)-(4) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
3 1. CompareIn re Rutt, 98 Bankr. 490, 492 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988) (after confirmation, funds
trustee received for payment to creditors under terms of confirmed plan are not property of the
estate), aff'd sub nom. Laughlin v. Commissioner, 98 Bankr. 494 (D. Neb. 1989), with In re
Littke, 105 Bankr. 905, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (dictum) (property of the estate exists after
confirmation).
32. E.g., Littke, 105 Bankr. at 908-09 (the split in authority arises out of the different
emphasis courts place upon Code sections 1306 and 1327); In re Osei, 90 Bankr. 910, 911 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1988) (two conflicting Code sections come into play when determining what constitutes
property of the estate after confirmation).
33. See supra note 18 for text of section 1306(a)(1)-(2).
34. Section 1327(b) states: "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in the plan or the order confirming
the plan, the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor." 11
U.S.C.A. § 1327(b) (West 1979).
35. Id.
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property of the estate fail to state when property of the estate ceases to
exist.3 6 Courts therefore argue whether property of the estate terminates at confirmation when it vests in debtor, or whether property of
the estate exists after confirmation until the case is closed, dismissed,
or converted.3 7 Furthermore, courts disagree whether property debtor
acquires after confirmation ever qualifies as property of the estate.
Courts must analyze two kinds of property when deciding what
constitutes property of the estate after confirmation. The first form
includes property debtor owns when the bankruptcy case is commenced and property debtor acquires after the case is commenced, but
before confirmation.3" The second form includes property acquired by
debtor after confirmation, most often debtor's post-confirmation
wages.

39

Courts reach conflicting conclusions regarding the nature of property of the estate after confirmation. Some courts hold that vesting
property of the estate in debtor at confirmation terminates both the
estate and the automatic stay.' Other courts conclude that vesting
property of the estate in debtor removes from the estate any property
not designated in the plan. 4 ' Property designated in the repayment
plan, however, qualifies as property of the estate.4 2 Still other courts
state that property of the estate exists after confirmation with title
merely vesting in debtor.43 Under this third view, debtor retains full
use of the property, limited only by the terms of the repayment plan,
and the stay protects all property. 44 Finally, some courts turn to equi36. Id. §§ 541, 1306 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
37. Id. § 1307 (regarding conversion or dismissal of a Chapter 13 case). The Chapter 13 case
is closed and debtor discharged upon completion of all payments under the plan. Id. § 1328.
38. Problems involving property of the estate owned by debtor before confirmation can arise
where debtor's residence becomes property of the estate at commencement of the case. After
confirmation, creditors might proceed against debtor's residence to satisfy debt. Whether the
residence remains property of the estate after confirmation is unclear. CompareIn re Walker, 84

Bankr. 888, 888 (Bankr. D.C. 1988) (post-petition creditor not required to seek relief from stay
to proceed against debtor's condominium unit) with In re Schewe, 94 Bankr. 938, 945 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1989) (debtors' possessory interest in residential real property remains property of
the estate after confirmation).
39. Post-confirmation creditors may commence garnishment proceedings against debtor's
post-confirmation wages. Courts must determine whether property acquired after confirmation
ever becomes property of the estate. See, eg., In re Mason, 45 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984),
aff'd, 51 Bankr. 548 (D. Or. 1985).
40. Eg., In re Dickey, 64 Bankr. 3, 4 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1985); Mason, 45 Bankr. at 498.
41. E.g., In re Root, 61 Banks. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986); In re Johnson, 36 Bankr.
958, 959 (Bankr. D. Utah 1983).
42. See Root, 61 Bankr. at 985.
43. E.g., In re Aneiro, 72 Bankr. 424 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987).
44. Id. at 429.
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table considerations.4 5 Most recently, one court balanced the competing interests of debtor and creditor to conclude that property of the
estate exists after confirmation.4 6
A.

Mason: Confirmation Terminates Property of the Estate

An early line of authority holds that property of the estate ceases to
exist upon confirmation. In In re Mason, the court held that when
property of the estate vests in debtor at confirmation, the estate ceases
to exist unless debtor specifically states otherwise in the plan.47 In
Mason, debtor's Chapter 13 plan specifically stated that all property
vested in debtor at confirmation. 48 Therefore, property of the estate
did not exist after confirmation and the stay did not protect debtor's
post-confirmation wages from garnishment by a post-confirmation
creditor.4 9
To justify its decision, the court weighed the rights of debtors and
creditors generally after confirmation. Before confirmation, the bankruptcy court has title to and control over property of the estate."
After confirmation, debtor obtains title to property of the estate and
may use, sell, or lease it without court approval. Post-confirmation
creditors, therefore, may deal with debtor as if no bankruptcy case
existed. 1 Otherwise, post-confirmation creditors might be reluctant
to extend credit, thus frustrating Chapter 13 debtors' rehabilitation
efforts." In addition, the court reasoned that it should not delay postconfirmation creditors, who have no opportunity to object to debtor's
plan, from collecting their damages.5 3 Debtor, on the other hand, may
protect himself from unexpected expenses by insurance, if necessary,
54
and modify the plan to permit payment of post-confirmation debt.
45. See infra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
46. In re Schewe, 94 Bankr. 938, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
47. In re Mason, 45 Bankr. 498 (Bankr. D. Or. 1984), aff'd, 51 Bankr. 548 (D. Or. 1985).
The court specifically addressed whether the stay prohibits garnishment proceedings after
confirmation. The court held that wages earned by debtors after confirmation of the Chapter 13
plan do not constitute property of the estate because no estate exists after confirmation. Id. at
501.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 500.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 501.
54. Id.
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More recent decisions criticize Mason for misinterpreting the effect
of confirmation,5 5 for not acknowledging the ambiguity between sections 1306 and 1327(b),5 6 and for giving insufficient weight to the policy of debtor rehabilitation underlying Chapter 13 proceedings.57
Most courts addressing whether property of the estate exists after confirmation do not consider Mason persuasive.58 Using diverse rationales, courts recognize that at least a portion of debtor's postconfirmation property qualifies as property of the estate.
B.

Root: Limited Existence of Property of the Estate

Refusing to follow Mason, a second line of authority holds that
debtor's property qualifies as property of the estate after confirmation,
but only to the extent provided in the confirmed plan. In the leading
case, In re Root, the court stated that property of the estate exists after
confirmation, consisting of debtor's property and future earnings designated in the plan.5 9 Under the Root analysis, debtor's wages up to
the amount of plan payments constitute property of the estate and
receive protection from creditors by the automatic stay.6
The Root court rejected the Mason analysis, reasoning that an estate
must continue to exist after confirmation, or else Chapter 13 trustees
have nothing to administer.6 1 Chapter 13 trustees must file final
reports and accounts detailing the estate's administration.62 Trustees
could not carry out their responsibilities if the entire estate ceased to
exist at confirmation. Therefore, property of the estate exists after
confirmation, although limited to the property mentioned in the repayment plan.63
55. See In re Aneiro, 72 Bankr. 424, 428-29 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987) (Mason line of authority
based upon the mistaken belief that vesting at confirmation transforms property of the estate into
property of the debtor).
56. See In re Clarke, 71 Bankr. 747, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (courts following Mason do
not acknowledge the conflict between sections 1306 and 1327(b)).
57. See In re Schewe, 94 Bankr. 938, 942-45 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
58. E.g., In re Root, 61 Bankr. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (strongly disagrees with
Mason). But see In re Osei, 90 Bankr. 910, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (court inclined to agree
with Mason's reasoning).
59. Root, 61 Bankr. at 985. The Internal Revenue Service sought a levy against debtor,
demanding payment of fees debtor owed his attorney for income tax purposes. Debtor paid his
attorney prior to the demand, however, pursuant to a confirmed Chapter 13 plan. The court
determined that the IRS did not attempt to obtain property of the estate, yet proceeded to decide
whether property of the estate exists after confirmation. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 704(9) (West Supp. 1989) (made applicable to Chapter 13
trustees by 11 U.S.C.A. § 1302(b)(1) (West Supp. 1989)).
63. Root, 61 Bankr. at 985.
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C

Two Approaches to Post-ConfirmationProperty of the Estate

1.

Aneiro: Vesting Does Not Terminate

In a more generous approach than either Mason or Root, some
courts state that property of the estate exists after confirmation with
the stay's full protection from creditors.' 4 In In re Aneiro, for example, the court stated that property vesting in debtor at confirmation
remains property of the estate after confirmation.6" The court reasoned that under section 1306, property of the estate continues to exist
until the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
another chapter. 66 Vesting does not convert property of the estate into
property of debtor because debtor may not use the property as he
pleases. 67
The Aneiro court attempted to reconcile sections 1306 and 1327(b).
Confirmation does not dictate when property of the estate terminates. 68 Instead, the relevant events are dismissal, closing, or conversion.69 When property vests in debtor at confirmation, it remains
property of the estate subject to the confirmation order's terms and the
stay's protection.7 °
2.

Schewe: Balancing Competing Interests

One court recently used a balancing test to determine whether postconfirmation property qualifies as property of the estate. Although
earlier decisions discussed the policies underlying Chapter 13, the
court in In re Schewe focused solely on these policies to balance the
competing interests of debtor and creditor, holding that property of
64. See, e.g., In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410, 1414 (9th Cir. 1985) (property of the estate continues
to exist following confirmation although ownership vests in debtor).
65. In re Aneiro, 72 Bankr. 424, 429 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). The Aneiro court considered
whether a nonresidential lease validly assumed by debtors after confirmation constituted
property of the estate. If so, debtors must receive court approval before modifying the lease. The
court decided the lease was property of the estate. Id. at 428-29.
66. Id. at 429.
67. Id. The Aneiro court reasoned that monies and property committed to the plan are still
subject to the trustee's supervision and control as necessary to execute the plan. Id.; see also 11
U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(1) (West 1979). If debtor fails to make payments to the confirmed plan, the
trustee may seek dismissal for cause. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c) (West Supp. 1989).
68. Aneiro, 72 Bankr. at 429. The court reasoned that if Congress intended confirmation to
affect Chapter 13's expansive definition of property of the estate, it would have drafted such a
provision. Id.
69. Id.; see also I1 U.S.C.A. § 1306(a) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
70. Aneiro, 72 Bankr. at 429.
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the estate exists after confirmation.7 1 Debtors in Schewe commenced
adversary proceedings to prevent their eviction from a leased mobile
home lot. Debtors' leasehold interest in the lot converted to property
of the estate when the case commenced. The court decided whether it
maintained that status after confirmation.1 2 The Schewe court held
that debtors' possessory interest in residential real property remained
property of the estate.7 3
The Schewe court considered the competing policies of protecting
debtor and preserving creditors' property rights in relation to the facts
of the case before it. Chapter 13 bankruptcy's primary goal is debtor
rehabilitation. The stay facilitates debtor rehabilitation by protecting
debtor's property and thus giving debtor time to consummate a confirmed repayment plan.7 4 Therefore, the stay should continue to protect debtor's property. Creditors not included in the confirmed plan
are protected because they may move for relief from the stay.75 Creditors seeking relief from stay are not substantially harmed during the
short period before the bankruptcy court hears their motion.7 6
The equities in Schewe favored debtors.7 7 Debtors' ability to earn
income and carry out the repayment plan required continued occupancy of the family residence. 8 Without protection of the stay, creditors could evict debtors without prior court approval. The threat of
losing the family home jeopardized debtors' rehabilitation efforts.7 9
Under the Schewe analysis, the court balances the competing interests of debtor and post-confirmation creditor. The court considers
whether lifting the stay impairs debtor's ability to repay creditors
71. In re Schewe, 94 Bankr. 938, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
At least two other courts recognize the necessity of balancing equities. In re Osei, 90 Bankr.
910, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Il1. 1988) (agrees with Mason, but balances equities to determine whether
the stay applies); In re Clarke, 71 Bankr. 747, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (agrees with Root's
reasoning, but balances equities, holding in favor of debtor).
72. Schewe, 94 Bankr. at 942.
73. Id. at 946.
74. Id. at 945.
75. Id. Bankruptcy courts can terminate, annul, modify, or condition the stay. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(d) (West Supp. 1989); see also Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 25, at 614-17 (discussing
elements to be proved at hearing for relief from stay). Bankruptcy courts also can, with or
without hearing, grant relief from stay to prevent irreparable damage to creditor. 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 362(f) (West Supp. 1989).
76. Schewe, 94 Bankr. at 945.
77. See id. The Schewe court distinguished the facts of its case from cases regarding
nondischargeable support obligations and recognized that the equities favor parties seeking to
recover debtor's property in those cases because ex-spouses and minor children are entitled to
support for daily needs. Id.
78. Id. at 945.
79. See id.
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according to the repayment plan, thus frustrating debtor's rehabilitation efforts. Furthermore, under the balancing test, the court considers the possible harm to post-confirmation creditors should the stay
continue.
III.

BANKRUPTCY COURTS SHOULD EMPLOY A
BALANCING TEST

Bankruptcy courts, as courts of equity, adjudicate disputes by balancing debtor and creditor's competing interests. 80 Bankruptcy courts
may use their broad equitable powers to issue any order necessary to
carry out the Code's purposes."' Bankruptcy courts, therefore, should
employ a balancing test when determining whether the automatic stay
protects post-confirmation property. A balancing test allows courts to
consider the competing factors in particular cases rather than apply
rigid rules. This leads to decisions equitably balancing debtor and
creditor's interests.
A.

Rigid Rules Defeat Chapter 13's Goals

The Mason court's rigid rule undermines Chapter 13 debtor's rehabilitation efforts by opening the door for any post-confirmation creditor to pursue actions against debtor's post-confirmation property.8 2
The Mason court focused on section 1327(b) without considering section 1306. The court's failure to consider section 1327(b) and section
1306 together creates a rule giving insufficient weight to debtor rehabilitation, thus defeating the stay's purpose.
The Mason decision impairs debtor's ability to carry out the confirmed plan's terms. The stay facilitates debtor rehabilitation by giving debtor a "breathing spell" from creditors during which debtor can
implement the repayment plan.8 3 Debtor's post-confirmation wages
fund the repayment plan. 84 If the stay terminates after confirmation,
post-confirmation creditors may garnish debtor's post-confirmation
wages without the bankruptcy court's intervention. Lifting the stay
may impair debtor's capacity to pay the trustee pursuant to the terms
of the confirmed plan.85 If debtor does not pay, the trustee may move
80.

Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (bankruptcy courts are courts of equity with

summary jurisdiction to adjudicate questions between debtor and creditors arising during
administration of debtor's estate).
81.

11 U.S.C.A. § 105(a) (West Supp. 1989).

82.
83.
84.
85.

For facts and discussion of In re Mason, see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 6296-97.
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
See In re Root, 61 Bankr. 984, 985 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1986).
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to dismiss the case for failure to perform under the repayment plan. 86
Debtor making his best effort to repay creditors according to the plan
"should not have his scarce resources and 'property of the estate'
invaded and the Plan doomed to failure" by post-confirmation creditors' actions.87
Similarly, the Root court's rigid rule burdens debtor with the results
of poorly drafted repayment plans.88 In Root, the court held that only
property designated in the plan remains property of the estate after
confirmation. 89 The stay protects only post-confirmation property
specified in the plan.
The Root decision wrongly places the burden of specifying what
property the stay protects on debtor and debtor's attorney. For example, the repayment plan must specify that debtor pay the trustee a
fixed amount of future earnings.9" Under the Root analysis, if a plan
refers to no other property, property of the estate includes only postconfirmation wages used to fund the repayment plan. Therefore, the
stay does not protect debtor's post-confirmation wages beyond those
required for plan payments. However, debtor might incur additional
debt after confirmation. If post-confirmation creditors can automatically proceed to obtain post-confirmation wages not used to fund the
plan, debtor's wages needed for daily living expenses are diminished,
thus frustrating rehabilitation efforts. Although one creditor might
not upset payments to the plan, several creditors demanding equal
access to debtor's post-confirmation property without court intervention will upset payments, possibly forcing debtor into Chapter 7
liquidation.
Applying Root to debtor's residential property further illustrates the
decision's destructive effect. If the residence does not remain property
of the estate after confirmation, the automatic stay no longer applies
and creditors may proceed to evict debtor without court intervention.
Debtor's performance under the repayment plan requires continued
occupation of the family residence. Thus, post-confirmation creditors'
actions against debtor's residence disrupt the plan's performance.
Rather than apply a rigid rule based solely on the wording of the plan,
a court should consider whether allowing the post-confirmation creditor to proceed impairs debtor's efforts to comply with the confirmed
plan.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

See id.; 11 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c) (West 1979 & Supp. 1989).
In re Clarke, 71 Bankr. 747, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
For facts and discussion of In re Root, see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
Root, 61 Bankr. at 985.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1322(a)(1) (West 1979).
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Conversely, courts also should consider the impact on the post-confirmation creditor. Rather than holding that the stay bars enforcement of all post-confirmation creditors' actions against property of the
estate, bankruptcy courts should use their equitable powers to protect
post-confirmation creditors. Bankruptcy courts' powers include lifting
or modifying the stay when the equities favor a particular post-confirmation creditor.9 1 In addition, courts need not punish post-confirmation creditors violating the stay because they were not aware of
debtor's pending bankruptcy case. Courts should not fine or hold in
contempt post-confirmation creditors who unwittingly violate the stay,
particularly when the plan is not jeopardized.92
Although the conclusion that post-confirmation property always
receives the stay's protection, as the Aneiro court stated, corresponds
with the policy of debtor rehabilitation, this rule completely ignores
the competing interest of creditors' rights.93 The Aneiro court engaged
in no equitable analysis, merely stating that property vesting in debtor
remains property of the estate, protected by the stay until the case is
closed, dismissed, or converted. The Aneiro court's reasoning has several ramifications with respect to the two forms of post-confirmation
property.9 4 First, all property acquired after confirmation constitutes
property of the estate and is automatically protected by the stay. Second, property already property of the estate remains so after confirmation, with full protection of the stay. Third, and most significant,
courts need not engage in an equitable analysis by examining the relative rights of the particular debtor and creditor involved. As a result,
although the stay protects debtor throughout the pending bankruptcy
case, the stay barring enforcement of all actions against property of
the estate potentially harms post-confirmation creditors.
The Aneiro rule does not consider why debtor incurred the postconfirmation debt or the type of creditor involved. The Aneiro rule
may cause debtor to abuse the stay's protection by incurring large
amounts of unnecessary debt. Therefore, the stay should remain in
effect to prevent creditors' actions against property necessary for
debtor's rehabilitation. This conclusion further supports the Schewe
approach that property of the estate includes all property necessary to
carry out debtor's repayment plan, which may include property
91. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
92. See, e.g., Johnson & O'Leary, supra note 25, at 618 (it is generally agreed that one who
has no actual notice of the stay cannot be held in contempt of court).
93. For facts and discussion of Aneiro, see supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the two types of post-confirmation property, see supranotes 38-39 and
accompanying text.
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acquired after confirmation but not listed in the plan. Rather than
applying a rigid rule as the Aneiro court did, a balancing test guides
bankruptcy courts when deciding whether the stay protects post-confirmation property.
B. Balancing Test Ensures Equity Between Debtor and Creditor
Use of a balancing test can serve both debtor's and creditor's interests.9" For example, the approach adopted by the Schewe court
acknowledges bankruptcy law's dual goals to rehabilitate debtor and
preserve creditors' rights.96 The court in Schewe considered the status
of debtors' residence after confirmation. Debtors would have lost the
family home if creditor could have proceeded against the residence
without court intervention.9 7 After balancing both debtors' and creditor's interests, the Schewe court held that debtor's possessory interest
in residential real property remains property of the estate after confirmation. The automatic stay, therefore, applies both before and after
confirmation. 98
Although the nature of the property in Schewe was different than in
Mason or Root, identical policy concerns apply. The Schewe court
wanted to prevent post-confirmation creditors from disrupting
debtor's rehabilitation efforts. 99 This concern applies even more
strongly to debtor's post-confirmation wages funding the repayment
plan.
A balancing test to determine whether the stay protects post-confirmation wages ensures that debtor can fund the repayment plan, which
in turn ensures that creditors provided for in the plan obtain their fair
share of debtor's assets. Post-confirmation creditors should not automatically garnish debtor's wages. Bankruptcy courts should utilize
their power to intervene and determine whether the facts warrant
modifying, annulling, terminating, or lifting the stay.

95. Some courts already reach equitable solutions, while purporting to follow rigid rules
established by earlier decisions. For example, one court agreed with the Mason court's
reasoning, but balanced the equities between debtor and creditor. In re Osei, 90 Bankr. 910, 912
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (debtor not harmed by allowing creditor to pursue satisfaction of its postpetition debt because the stay was already lifted once).
96. For facts and discussion of Schewe, see supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text.
97. In re Schewe, 94 Bankr. 938, 945 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
98. Id. at 946.
99. See id at 945-46.
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The Balancing Test

The court should weigh four factors when balancing debtor's and
post-confirmation creditor's interests. First, the court must determine
whether allowing the post-confirmation creditor's action to proceed
against property of the estate will adversely affect debtor's ability to
perform under the confirmed plan. Allowing one creditor's collection
suit may not upset debtor's performance, but allowing several creditors to do so will. Therefore, the court should resist opening the door
to multiple creditors' actions. Otherwise, debtor and the creditors
listed in debtor's plan all suffer the consequences, thereby defeating
both purposes of Chapter 13 proceedings.
Second, the court must determine whether debtor needs the property at issue to complete plan payments. Certainly, the stay should
protect property used to fund the plan, such as post-confirmation
wages in the amount of plan payments. In addition, rehabilitation
requires that debtor retain the family residence, whether or not listed
in the plan. Post-confirmation wages not used to fund the plan also
warrant the stay's protection. Debtor needs available income for daily
living expenses as well as emergencies. However, the court may discontinue the stay when the post-confirmation creditor seeks income
not used to fund the plan or necessary for daily needs. The court must
determine whether the action disrupts debtor's plan payments.
Third, the court should evaluate the possible damage to the postconfirmation creditor if it delays collection by declaring the action
void." Creditors rarely incur significant damage by waiting a few
days for the court to evaluate whether their claims warrant lifting the
stay. The court also should determine whether creditor knew of the
pending bankruptcy and yet proceeded against debtor's property without first seeking relief from the stay. The court should not declare
void actions brought by post-confirmation creditors who unwittingly
100. Some commentators argue that the automatic stay provisions of the Code erode the
rights of secured creditors. White, The Recent Erosion of the Secured Creditor'sRights Through
Cases, Rules and Statutory Changes in Bankruptcy Law, 53 Miss. L.J. 389 (1983); Comment,
Automatic Stay Under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Equitable Roadblock to Secured Creditor
Relief 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1113 (1980). Although the issue of unsecured versus secured
creditor status does not arise in cases discussing whether the stay protects property after
confirmation, secured creditor status provides a possible argument for post-confirmation
creditors seeking to bypass the automatic stay. Congress, however, recognized that giving
secured creditors absolute rights may seriously impair debtor's rehabilitation. See 1978 SENATE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 5839. In addition, alternative provisions of the Code protect secured
creditors where necessary for the rehabilitative process. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C.A. § 1305 (West
1979) (allowing creditors to file post-petition claims for consumer debts arising after the case is
commenced); I1 U.S.C.A. § 362 (West 1979 & Supp. 1989) (creditors may seek relief from stay).
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violate the stay, especially those with small claims.1 'O However, the
court may penalize post-confirmation creditors intentionally violating
the stay." 2 A balancing test allows the court to hold that the stay
does not apply should injury to the post-confirmation creditor outweigh debtor's ability to complete plan payments.
Fourth, bankruptcy courts should consider whether debtor genuinely attempts to follow the plan, or instead abuses the stay's protec-.
tion. The equities may favor post-confirmation creditors if debtor
abuses the stay's protection by incurring large amounts of unnecessary
debt. Bankruptcy courts should not encourage debtor to use the stay
to incur additional debt while avoiding creditors. The stay's continued
protection should not extend to the debtor who fails to carry his
weight during the rehabilitation process. In addition, by discouraging
debtor from abusing the stay, creditors gain incentive to extend credit
to the responsible Chapter 13 debtor.
2. Equitable Results Outweigh Unpredictability
A balancing test's benefits outweigh its drawbacks. Balancing tests
do not provide predictable, uniform results. As the discussed case law
illustrates, however, although courts apply inconsistent reasoning, the
trend of authority recognizes that balancing the equities achieves fair
results. 10 3 A test balancing the competing interests of debtors and
creditors enables bankruptcy courts to evaluate on a case-by-case basis
whether the stay applies to post-confirmation property. 0 4
Courts should decide the stay's duration on a case-by-case basis,
rather than by a rigid legislative rule. Rigid rules ultimately result in
inequitable decisions. Courts applying a balancing test achieve the
equity between debtors and creditors intended by bankruptcy laws.
Bankruptcy courts should formulate bankruptcy policy. Bankruptcy courts' jurisdiction includes suits between debtor and creditors
arising during administration of debtor's estate.' 0 5 Unlike courts of
general jurisdiction, bankruptcy courts understand the policies underlying bankruptcy law and the law's impact on individual debtors and
creditors.
101. See In re Lewis, 33 Bankr. 98, 101 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (where lawsuit for postpetition debts does not catastrophically affect the plan, creditor may pursue its remedies in a state

forum).
102. See supra note 25.
103. See supra notes 71-79, 96 and accompanying text.
104. See Comment, supra note 100, at 1122-34 (discussing case-by-case development of law
regarding automatic stay and adequate protection for secured creditors).
105. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966).
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CONCLUSION

Because of the ambiguity created by sections 1306 and 1327(b) of
the Code, courts disagree whether the automatic stay protects debtor's
property after confirmation of a Chapter 13 repayment plan. Courts
addressing this issue generally adopt rigid rules with results benefiting
either debtor or creditor. These decisions open the door to abuse of
the stay's protection by debtors, and harassment of debtors by creditors. Better reasoned decisions, however, balance the equities of the
particular debtor and creditor before the court, while attempting to
carry out the dual goals of debtor rehabilitation and equitable treatment of creditors.
Using a balancing test, bankruptcy courts should address four factors to decide whether the stay protects property after confirmation:
whether post-confirmation creditors' actions adversely effect debtor's
ability to complete plan payments, whether debtor's performance
under the plan requires the property at issue, whether continuation of
the stay irreparably harms the post-confirmation creditor, and
whether debtor carries his weight in the rehabilitation process by not
abusing the stay's protection.
A balancing test enables bankruptcy courts to resolve the current
disagreement over whether the automatic stay protects post-confirmation property. A balancing test allows courts to evaluate on a case-bycase basis whether the stay should remain in effect after confirmation.
Although rigid rules are predictable, a balancing test enables bankruptcy courts to use their broad equitable powers to carry out the policies underlying Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.
Vickie L. Vaska

